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I. INTRODUCTION
The signing of the Rome Statute that created the International Criminal
Court (ICC) was viewed by many in the international law community as a
constitutional moment not unlike the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789.1
In giving birth to a new type of legal institution, the Rome Statute created a
void in the ability of any existing body of law to precisely convey the
nature of the ICC. The Court is neither in a direct vertical nor horizontal
relationship to State courts, with the result that traditional international or
national legal norms do not apply.2 The federal courts in relation to state
courts initially encountered much the same problems that the ICC is
encountering in relation to national courts because the federal court system
* Law Clerk to the Hon. Morris E. Lasker, Senior United States District Judge, District of
Massachusetts. J.D., Harvard Law School; M.P.P., John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University; B.S., Yale University.
1. Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An
Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 407 (2000).
2. See Harold Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS.
L. REv. 623 (1998) (differentiating between horizontal regimes in which nation states interact on a state-
to state level within treaty regimes, and vertical regimes in which international legal norms are promoted
from one body and are integrated through trickle-down into each nation at a domestic level; the ICC
does not require integrating legislation by State Parties, yet it does not interact on a state-to-state level,
thus occupying a strange in-between space).
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provided an entirely new way of imagining the American legal structure.3
Although the comparison is not perfect, the similarities in the situations
render the doctrines of federal courts law highly relevant to a study of the
manner in which the ICC can interact with States.4 Federal courts law
contains a wealth of doctrines such as exhaustion and abstention that are
useful both for explaining ICC deference to State proceedings, a regime
known as complementarity, and how or when the ICC can or should deviate
from that initial deference.
II. BACKGROUND
The International Criminal Court (ICC) came into existence as a result
of a multilateral convention, known as the Rome Statute, that was signed on
July 17, 1998. 5 The Rome Statute was voted into effect by 120 States and
the Court was born on July 1, 2002.6 With almost a hundred ratifications,
the Court is now in its third year of existence. The Court consists of the
Presidency, Chambers, in which the judges sit, the Office of the Prosecutor,
which is responsible for receiving referrals, and conducting investigations
and prosecutions, and the Registry, which is responsible for non-judicial
aspects of the administration of the Court.7 In the greater context, the ICC
is the first court of its kind. It is a permanent criminal court whose nearest
relatives are the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), both of which,
however, are UN bodies that have limited geographical and temporal
jurisdiction!
3. WILFRED RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789: ExPOSING
MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING NEW EVIDENCE 5 (Wythe Holt & L.H. LaRue eds., Univ.
of Okla. Press 1990) ("The most striking fact about the new national judicial system is that it was in fact
new .... [rlt must be emphasized that the state judiciaries that existed at the end of the eighteenth
century were not organized in [the current] fashion, and that part of the controversy surrounding Article
III arose on this historical fact.").
4. See Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing Judicial System, 54 DUKE
L.J. 1143 (2005) (proposing the need to apply federal courts theory to the relationship of "supranational
courts" to domestic institutions).
5. WILLIAM SCHABAS, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court 1-25 (2004).
6. Id. at vii.
7. Id. at 151.
8. See generally ROY S. LEE, Introduction, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE
MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 1 (1999); SCHABAS, supra note 5; M.
CHERIF BASSIOUNI, Historical Survey: 1919-1998, in THE STATUE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1 (1998) [hereinafter Historical Survey]; Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998),
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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After a heated negotiation process in which the interests of sovereign
States and human rights groups and other NGOs clashed over the intended
strength of the Court, the Rome Statute bestowed upon the ICC a
complementarity regime that gives States the primary claim to conduct
proceedings in cases which might otherwise qualify for ICC jurisdiction.9
This idea is embodied in paragraph ten of the Rome Statute's Preamble as
the idea "that the International Criminal Court established under this Statute
shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions."' 0 Unlike the
ICTY and ICTR charters which give those courts primacy over any national
proceedings," the ICC is meant to be secondary and only provide a forum
when the State proceedings fail. For this purpose, the Court under Article
17 retains the ability to initiate investigations and prosecutions if, and only
if, it is able to show that the State is either not taking any action or that the
State is "unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or
prosecution."' 2 The idea is that,
In exercising its jurisdiction, the Court will be acting as an
extension of the territorial and national criminal jurisdiction
available to States Parties; by limiting such exercise to where
States are unable or unwilling, the Statute shows that the Court is
not also an extension of States Parties' national criminal justice
systems. It does not replace or supplant national jurisdictions.' 3
Crucial to this regime is the consent of the States who, through their
signatures, "recognize the Court's jurisdiction over all the crimes within its
9. See Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, The Rome Conference on an International Court:
The Negotiating Process, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 2 (1999); OTTO TRIFFTERER, Preliminary Remarks: The
Permanent ICC-Ideal and Reality, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 43 (1999); JOHN T. HOLMES, The
Principle of Complementarity, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME
STATUTE ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 41 (1999) [hereinafter Principle of Complementarity];
BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: BETWEEN
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 67-78 (2003) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE]. See
generally, WILLIAM DRISCOLL, JOSEPH ZOMPETTI, AND SUZETrE ZOMPETTI, eds., THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: GLOBAL POLITICS AND THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE (2004).
10. Rome Statute, supra note 8, at para. 10.
11. See Mohammed El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to
Implement International Criminal Law, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 869, 882-889 (2002); JOHN T. HOLMES,
Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC, in I THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 668-70 (Antonio Cassese et al., eds., 2002) [hereinafter National
Courts versus the ICC].
12. Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 17.
13. Bruce Broomhall, The International Criminal Court: Overview and Cooperation with
States, in ICC RATIFICATION AND NATIONAL IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 143 (1999) [hereinafter
Overview and Cooperation].
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jurisdiction."' 4 The foundation of the Court's jurisdiction is State consent
and it acts only as an extension of the national systems when the States are
incapable, not as an appellate court.'
5
To this end, the Court has a very specific realm in which it is designed
to function. The ICC has only subject matter jurisdiction over the crimes
listed and defined within the statute itself-namely, genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes. 16 Additionally, the Court is limited to
crimes committed after the enactment of the Statute, 17 and the Court's
jurisdiction can only be exercised via one of three ways: referral by a State
Party, referral by the Security Council, or the Prosecutor may initiate an
investigation based on his proprio motu power.'"
Although complementarity is typically deemed a safeguard for
national sovereignty, it actually encompasses a dual capacity. From a
simple viewpoint, complementarity allows the Court to defer to national
judiciaries and prevents the Court from taking jurisdiction away from
States.' 9 The interface of ICC and national jurisdiction, however, also
creates an area of expansion for ICC jurisdictional reach by allowing the
Court itself to review and assess national judiciaries. The tension between
the Court's twofold mandate to practice both restraint and autonomy again
recalls the federal court system's need to manage state court independence
while maintaining the supremacy of federal law and the Constitution.
The ICC in its incipient stages of development thus faces the challenge
of delineating limitations and standards for its process of admitting cases.
Just as the Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison reserved to itself the
ability to determine its own jurisdiction,2 ° so the Rome Statute charges the
ICC with the task of determining the extent of its own jurisdiction.21 As
14. Id. at64.
15. See Holmes, supra note 9, at 49 (citing the concerns of States that the Court not function
as a court of appeal).
16. These are listed and defined with great specificity in Art. 5-8. Crimes of aggression were
tabled under Art. 123 for further discussion and possible adoption at the first Review Conference seven
years after the entry into force of the Rome Statute. Rome Statute, supra note 8.
17. This is under jurisdiction ratione temporis in Article II of the Rome Statute.
18. Rome Statute, supra note 8, at arts. 13-15.
19. Complementarity is not precisely aligned with jurisdiction in that it hinges on
admissibility, a type of "quasi-jurisdictional" standard for determining the ICC's caseload which lacks a
counterpart in federal courts law. See Christopher Blakesley et al., Association of American Law
Schools Panel on the International Criminal Court, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REv 223, 247-49 (1999). For
purposes here, however, equating admissibility with a decision on jurisdiction is sufficient.
20. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
21. See Holmes, supra note 11, at 672 ("The ICC is arbiter of its own jurisdiction.... Article
19(1), for example, provides that the Court shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case. Article
17(1), states that it is the Court which shall determine whether a case is inadmissible.").
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part of its task, the Court must make determinations on admissibility
requirements, a task which begins with the guidelines prescribed by the
Rome Statute. Although the word complementarity is not used in the Rome
Statute, the idea is embodied in several parts of the treaty. For example, the
Preamble states that the ICC "shall be complementary to national criminal
jurisdictions. 22 The crux of the complementarity scheme, however, lies in
Article 17 which addresses admissibility. In short form, Article 17 requires
the Court to consider a case inadmissible when
a) A State is already investigating or prosecuting;
b) The State has already investigated and decided not to
prosecute;
c) The accused has already been tried; or
d) The case is not of sufficient gravity.23
A case is admissible, however, if the Prosecutor can prove that any of the
preceding scenarios resulted from the State's "unwillingness" or "inability"
to "genuinely" prosecute. The unwillingness factor is evaluated on the
basis of whether the national proceedings were designed to shield the
accused or constituted an unjustified delay inconsistent with bringing the
accused to justice.24 Inability, meanwhile, is determined on the basis of
whether "due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its
national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the
necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its
proceedings. 25
The complexities of the ICCs complementarity scheme are best
explored through a hypothetical extrapolation of the Security Council's
recent referral of the Darfur situation in Sudan according to Article 13(b) of
26the Rome Statute. Unlike the Court's current investigations in Uganda
and the Democratic Republic of Congo and its most recent referrals for
C6te d'Ivoire and the Central African Republic, all of which are signatories
of the Rome Statute and which were referred by the States themselves under
22. Rome Statute, supra note 8, pmbl. para. 10; see also id. at art. 1.
23. Id. at art. 17.
24. Id. at art. 17(2).
25. Id. at art. 17(3).
26. The crisis in Darfur is well-documented by groups such as Human Rights Watch, the
International Committee of the Red Cross, Doctors Without Borders as well as nations around the world.
The American government evaluated the killings in Darfur as rising to the level of a genocide. See
CNN, Powell Calls Sudan Killings Genocide, Sept. 9, 2004, available at
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/africa/09/09/sudan.powell (last visited Apr. 27, 2005); see also
Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 13(b).
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Article 13(a), Sudan is not a signatory of the Rome Statute.27 Prior to the
Security Council referral, the ICC Prosecutor was thus not able to
contemplate an investigation of the Darfur situation. Sudan has responded
vehemently that the ICC has no jurisdiction over its citizens and that it will
not cooperate with the ICC in any pursuant investigation.28
Ignoring for now the inevitable enforcement and cooperation issues
which would arise with the advent of an ICC investigation of a non-
cooperative State, the more pressing question raised by the Darfur situation
is how the Court addresses the issue of admissibility. Because the previous
referrals have come from the States themselves, amounting to a waiver of
the admissibility requirement,29 the Court has never actually addressed
admissibility. The exceptions to complementarity seem theoretically simple
enough-mere proof of unwillingness or inability-but when faced with
Darfur, a situation in which the national government and judiciary is
actually intact and unwilling to cede to ICC jurisdiction, forging ahead
freely with a claimed right to review and prosecute does not seem that
simple.
The first scenario for Darfur is the no-man's land state of affairs such
as existed before the Sudanese government created the Darfur Special
Criminal Court, a three-judge traveling court, in June 2005. Prior to that
time, the Sudanese government had not opened a formal investigation into
the situation in Darfur, although all parties were doubtless aware of the
numerous atrocities which had been committed. The Khartoum regime,
despite the international outcry over its handling of Darfur, continually
made reassurances to the international community that it was properly
managing the situation without actually committing to anything.3° The
Prosecutor, meanwhile, must act on the referral handed down by the
Security Council.31 Article 53 bestows the Prosecutor with discretion to
27. STATE PARTIES TO THE ROME STATUE OF THE ICC, ACCORDING TO THE UN GENERAL
ASSEMBLY REGIONAL GROUPS (2006), available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/
RATIFICATIONSbyUNGroups.pdf/.
28. Warren Hoge, International War Crimes Prosecutor Gets List of 51 Sudan Suspects, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 2005, at A6 (Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir swore "thrice in the name of Almighty
God... I shall never hand any Sudanese national to a foreign court" and vowed to prosecute war crime
suspects itself.).
29. See infra p. 28 for discussion about referrals and waivers.
30. See, e.g., Koert Lindijer, Analysis: Reining in the Militia, BBC NEWS, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3594520.stm (Oct. 25, 2004) (last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
31. There is the temptation to view a Security Council referral as a clear waiver of any
admissibility considerations. See El Zeidy, supra note 11, at 957 ("[F]rom a purely formal
standpoint.., the referral of a situation by the Security Council is deemed a reasonable basis for the
Prosecutor to initiate an investigation, without the preventive review of the admissibility of the situation
with an eye to the application of the principle of complementarity. One view even goes as far as stating
[Vol. 13:3
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dismiss the situation, listing several factors that may form the basis of
dismissal, including admissibility under Article 17.32 On a practical level,
even a Security Council referral will not abolish the Prosecutor's need to
evaluate the admissibility of a case either before or after an investigation
begins.
According to the Court's own guidelines, in the absence of any current
or past State action on the matter, the ICC faces no impediment to
commencing an investigation.33 The Court presumes that if it has an
interest in beginning an investigation and a State is lodged in an "inaction"
stage, admissibility is not an issue that necessitates debate because inaction
equates to clear admissibility. 34  This stance on the inaction scenario is
noticeably stronger than the words used in Article 17 and elsewhere in the
Rome Statute. For example, Article 17(1) utilizes a double negative type of
structure to state that a case is inadmissible unless the elements of unwilling
or unable are present.35 The presumption underlying complementarity is
deference to national prosecution unless the State shows itself to be ill-
equipped. An interpretation of the Court's stance regarding complete State
inaction may be that inaction is the most severe type of unwillingness
which merits omission of the admissibility determination.
A slightly different scenario is envisioned under Article 17(1)(b).36
For a case in which the State has already conducted an investigation and
decided not to prosecute, the ICC must cede and consider the case
inadmissible unless the decision not to move forward was spurred by the
State's unwillingness or inability.37 Although inadmissibility is not as
easily waived for this situation, the inaction of the State will still lead to an
that the Prosecutor is required to launch an investigation after a Security Council referral and has
discretion to discontinue only after the investigation has begun."); See Schabas, supra note 5, at 123.
32. In addition to admissibility, Article 53(l) specifies that the Prosecutor may consider
whether there is "a reasonable basis to believe that a crime" has been committed and whether, "taking
into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of the victims, there are nonetheless substantial
reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice." Rome Statute, supra
note 8, at art. 51
33. Office of the Prosecutor Informal Expert Paper, The Principle of Complementarity in
Practice, International Criminal Court (2003), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/otp/complementarity.
html (last visited Apr. 27, 2005) [hereinafter Complementarity in Practice].
34. Id. ("[Tihe most straightforward scenario is where no State has initiated any investigation
(the inaction scenario). In such a scenario, none of the alternatives of Articles 17(l)(a)-(c) are satisfied
and there is no impediment to admissibility. Thus, there is no need to examine the factors of
unwillingness or inability; the case is simply admissible under the clear terms of Article 17.").
35. Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 17(1).
36. Id. at art. 17(l)(b).
37. Sharon Williams, Issues ofAdmissibility, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 393 (Triffterer ed.,
1999).
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assumption of admissibility by the Court in the absence of ongoing
proceedings, or else an evaluation of the State's willingness or ability which
will likely spur the State into the next scenario discussed below. In either
case, for practical purposes inaction and a decision to not prosecute will be
approached in the same way by the Court.
Darfur in this first scenario in which it has either no history of an
investigation or prosecution or no intention of commencing proceedings,
thus creates very little clash between ICC and national jurisdiction since
only one jurisdiction-that of the Court-is being asserted. Realistically,
this stage will almost never persist unless the State, for some political
reason, secretly desired the ICC intervention and proceeds to cooperate with
the ICC.38  Otherwise, the inaction stage seems inextricably tied to a
negative response on the part of the State whose jurisdiction has been
questioned.
The State's reaction to the ICC intention to investigate leads to the
second scenario which is the current situation. The Sudanese government
followed through with its statements and began its own national
proceedings against the alleged perpetrators of crimes punishable under the
Rome Statute. Because the Darfur referral came via the Security Council,
the Court's response follows different rules than for a State Party referral or
an exercise of the Prosecutor's proprio motu powers. 39  According to
Article 19 of the Statute, Sudan is allowed to challenge the admissibility of
the case to the ICC, which it presumably would do if it were conducting its
own proceedings. 40  Article 19 makes no specific requirement upon the
Prosecutor to defer to the State investigation, which means this second
scenario branches into two paths: 1) the Prosecutor defers to the State in
much the same manner as he would under Article 18,41 or 2) he prepares to
38. See infra note 165.
39. See Rome Statute, supra note 8, at arts. 13, 15 and 18. If the situation is referred to the
Court by a State Party under Article 13(a) or is initiated by the Prosecutor's use of the proprio motu
power under Articles 13(c) and 15, then the Prosecutor must fulfill certain obligations according to
Article 18, which does not, however, refer to Security Council referrals like Darfur. Under Article 18,
the Prosecutor must notify all State Parties and the relevant States whose jurisdiction may overlap. If a
State informs the Court within one month of the notification that it is investigating or has investigated
the possible violations of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor must defer to the State investigation unless
the Pre-Trial Chamber authorizes further investigation. The Prosecutor is allowed to review the State's
investigation after six months and determine if there is any issue with unwillingness or inability.
40. Id. at art. 19.
41. See Antonio Cassese, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary
Reflections, 10 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 144, 159 (1999) ("[A]lthough no
notification is necessary in case of referral by the Security Council under Article 13(b), any state having
jurisdiction over the crimes which form the object of the referral is entitled to inform the Prosecutor that
it is investigating or prosecuting the case . . . thus obliging the Prosecutor to defer to the state's
authorities.").
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make the case that the Sudanese government is conducting proceedings that
qualify Sudan as "unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investiga-
tion or prosecution. ' ' 2 If the Court chooses to defer to Sudan, it can neatly
follow many of the doctrines which define the basis of federal courts law.
But if the Court, after taking stock of Sudan's proceedings and determining
that they do not meet Rome Statute standards, decides to remove the
investigation or prosecution to the ICC, it can utilize some of the exceptions
to the doctrines to define its boundaries and explain its determinations.
The first option most closely achieves the goal of promoting national
prosecutions and follows the path of least resistance by deferring to national
proceedings. The Court, by deferring to the State, supports the presumption
that the State has the primary or dominant claim to jurisdiction.43  This
tension between ICC and national jurisdiction is almost identical to a
cornerstone of American federal courts law-the tension between federal
and state power. Federal courts as created under Article III of the
Constitution were designed to implement the powers of the national
government and provide a uniform interpretation of the Constitution and
federal laws.44 The basic premise of the federal court system--that federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and that state courts are courts of
general jurisdiction-cedes only a parcel of jurisdiction to the federal
courts,45 a setup analogous to the way in which the ICC only maintains
"concurrent" jurisdiction over a narrow segment of a State's law.46 Federal
courts over the years have had to work around the initial limitations,
resulting in a body of prescriptions federal courts use to restrain themselves
which may provide good theoretical underpinnings to future ICC decisions.
III. EXHAUSTION OF STATE REMEDIES PRIOR TO FEDERAL HABEAS
One such doctrine federal courts follow in deferring to state
jurisdiction is exhaustion of state remedies. On a practical level, without
requiring exhaustion of state remedies, federal courts would not be able to
42. Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 17(1)(a).
43. See BROOMHALL, supra note 9, at 86; SCHABAS, supra note 5, at 67-68 ("The jurisdiction
that the international community has accepted for its new Court is narrower than the jurisdiction that
individual States are entitled to exercise with respect to the same crimes.").
44. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 2 (4th ed. 2003).
45. Id. at 259-65.
46. The status of ICC jurisdiction as "concurrent" is not necessarily unanimous. See Sadat and
Carden, supra note 1, at 414 (pointing to the exercise of ICC jurisdiction only under certain exceptional
circumstances). In the federalism sense, however, the relationship of the ICC to national jurisdictions is
clearly analogous to concurrent jurisdiction and, as discussed below, the manner in which federal and
state courts address concurrent jurisdiction is highly relevant to an analysis of any ICC-State
relationships. See Ruth Philips, The International Criminal Court Statute: Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, 10 CRIM. L. F. 61, 63 (1999).
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handle the volume of cases which would flood its circuits47 and state court
proceedings might face unduly delays and interference as parties invoked
federal proceedings.48 More importantly, however, the state exhaustion
requirement embodies a conscious effort to defer to states as legitimate and
equal seats of jurisdiction.49 By deferring to national proceedings, the ICC
can invoke this tradition of exhausting state remedies.
Federal habeas review is the most well-known residence of the
exhaustion requirement. The doctrine was codified in 28 U.S.C. §2254(b),
but the presumption that state remedies should be exhausted existed even
before then.5 ° Exhaustion seeks to preserve the delicate balance between
federal and state powers in order to better protect both federal and state
institutions. In part,
Exhaustion preserves the role of the state courts in the application
and enforcement of federal law. Early federal intervention in
state criminal proceedings would tend to remove federal
questions from the state courts, isolate those courts from
constitutional issues, and thereby remove their understanding of
and hospitality to federally protected interests. Second,
exhaustion preserves orderly administration of state judicial
business, preventing the interruption of state adjudication by
federal habeas proceedings. It is important that petitioners reach
state appellate courts, which can develop and correct errors of
state and federal law and most effectively supervise and impose
uniformity on trial courts.
51
47. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, at 649 ("Such concurrent jurisdiction is desirable
because, in the vast majority of cases, it is preferable for the Court to hear cases on appeal and not serve
as a trial court. The Supreme Court lacks the time and resources to function effectively as a court of
original jurisdiction.").
48. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399 (1900).
49. See Exparte Royall, 117 U.S. 241,251 (1886) ("the injunction to hear the case summarily,
and thereupon 'to dispose of the party as law and justice require' does not deprive the court of discretion
as to the time and mode in which it will exert the powers conferred upon it. That discretion should be
exercised in the light of the relations existing, under our system of government, between the judicial
tribunals of the Union and of the States, and in recognition of the fact that the public good requires that
those relations be not disturbed by unnecessary conflict between courts equally bound to guard and
protect rights secured by the Constitution.") (emphasis added).
50. See United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U.S. 13, 17 (1925) ("The due and orderly
administration of justice in a state court is not to be thus interfered with save in rare cases where
exceptional circumstances of peculiar urgency are shown to exist."); Exparte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 116-
18(1944).
51. Note, Developments in the Law: Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1038, 1094
(1970). See also Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 490 (1973) ("The
exhaustion doctrine is a judicially crafted instrument which reflects a careful balance between important
[Vol. 13:3
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Of these reasons, the first is particularly relevant to the ICC because of
the Court's small capacity and its reliance on the continued goodwill of the
international community. The ICC is a court of last resort not equipped to
handle more than a few selected cases at a time.52 Additionally, the Court
will fare better in gaining cooperation for a subsequent ICC proceeding if it
protects the State's proceedings as much as possible. 53 The ICC equivalent
of the "federally protected interests" is the interest in protecting State
resolve to prosecute the crimes under the Rome Statute.54 If made to feel
like an inadequate forum, a State may not work as hard to show its own
capability, thereby defeating the Court's purpose of encouraging States to
bring perpetrators to justice.55 In the case of Sudan, the Security Council
referral has put the spotlight on the country and if the ICC were to defer to
national proceedings, Sudan would know that its every action was being
scrutinized. In order to avoid further breach of international relations or
sanctions, Sudan would most likely attempt to conducts its proceedings in
accordance with some minimum standard of "being conducted
independently or impartially" consistent with "an intent to bring the person
concerned to justice. 56
This then integrates the second reason for the exhaustion requirement,
that of letting the state "develop and correct errors of state and federal
law." 57  Under the system of complementarity, the ICC has a secondary
mandate of developing State interpretations and applications of the Rome
Statute. When the Court watches and reviews the proceedings of national
jurisdictions in order to determine the constitution of acceptable proceed-
ings that avoid the ICCs reach, it is in fact propounding a set of guidelines
interests of federalism and the need to preserve the writ of habeas corpus as a 'swift and imperative
remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.'. . . It cannot be used as a blunderbuss to shatter
the attempt at litigation of constitutional claims with regard to the purposes that underlie the doctrine
and that called it into existence.").
52. See HOLMES, supra note 11, at 667-73.
53. See BROOMHALL, supra note 13, at 47.
54. See Rome Statute, supra note 8, at Preamble para. 6 ("Recalling that it is the duty of every
State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.").
55. See BROOMHALL, supra note 13, at 86 ("Because the Court has the power to make the
final decisions on the admissibility of cases before it, States that wish to avoid the adverse attention, the
diplomatic entanglements, the duty to cooperate and other consequences of ICC activity have a real
incentive to take action against crimes under the Statute.").
56. Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 17(2)(c). The importance of this wording lies in its
vagueness. While an ICC review of national proceedings would not call for a specific outcome, its
requirements as to what would satisfy inadmissibility leave States in a position where they really have to
make the best good-faith effort possible.
57. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44.
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for national laws and proceedings.58 The Court and States may engage in a
system of trial and error, but States will eventually come to mold their
national laws according to the ICC body of law. 59 The wonder of the
exhaustion process is that it does not require the ICC to brandish its
authority in order to achieve integration of Rome Statute components into
the national law-the Court can stay on the sidelines while the national
courts feel the burden of the Court's watchful eye exhorting the State to do
its best.
Related to the development of nationals laws is one of the most
fundamental issues the ICC faces within the complementarity scheme-the
lack of any required implementing legislation on the part of the signatory
States. The Rome Statute would have faced a wave of resistance if it had
pushed through with a requirement that all State Parties implement the
Statute's substantive law. 60 Although the Statute does impose an obligation
on States to cooperate under Part 9, that duty does not extend to legislation
incorporating the crimes.61 The resulting gap between the Rome Statute
and national laws is a potential complication for any review of national
proceedings purporting to determine ability, willingness and genuineness.
Utilizing national domestic laws, what can be called the "ordinary crimes
approach," a State with good intentions could fulfill its role according to
admissibility requirements without charging for the same crimes as the
Rome Statute.62
For example, if the Sudanese government investigated and/or
prosecuted several individuals for murder or rape (encompassed in the
atrocities alleged in Darfur) according to their national laws as "ordinary
58. See Michael Newton, Comparative Complementarity: Domestic Jurisdiction Consistent
with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REV. 20 32-33 (2001);
Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 2; Jenia lontcheva Turner, Nationalizing International Criminal Law, 41
STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 8-9 (2005).
59. Jann Kleffner, The Impact of Complementarity on National Implementation of Substantive
International Criminal Law, 1 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 86, 94 (2003) ("in order
for the ICC to effectively perform its complementary function, comprehensive implementation is
indispensable. To interpret the provisions on complementarity so as to give them the fullest weight and
effect consistent with the ICC's functions therefore involves an obligation on States parties to establish
their jurisdiction over the ICC crimes to the extent required for the purpose of national prosecution.").
60. Id. at 91.
61. See Iontcheva Turner, supra note 58, at 8.
62. Kleffher, supra note 59, at 95-99; see also SCHABAS, supra note 5, at 88;
Complementarity in Practice, supra note 33, at 8 ("It was extremely important to many States that
proceedings cannot be found 'non-genuine' simply because of a comparative lack of resources or
because of a lack of full compliance with all human rights standards. The issue is whether the
proceedings are so inadequate that they cannot be considered 'genuine' proceedings. Of course,
although the ICC is not a 'human rights court,' human rights standards may still be of relevance and
utility in assessing whether the proceedings are carried out genuinely.").
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crimes," the ICC could not automatically determine that the national
proceedings were insufficient because they did not prosecute the defendants
for genocide or crimes against humanity. Under a vertical application of
the doctrine of ne bis in idem, a relative of the American double jeopardy
doctrine, spelled out in Article 20, the Court must not prosecute a person
already tried by another court for the same conduct, even if the charge was
for an "ordinary crime. 63  Only on a showing that the State is not
conducting the investigation genuinely, or that it has conducted a trial only
to shield the perpetrator or not "independently or impartially in accordance
with the norms of due process recognized by international law and [the trial
was] conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent
with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice" can the Court exert
its own jurisdiction. 64  A State which has not passed implementing
legislation is not thus an automatic target of an ICC admissibility exception,
but the possibility that the ICC could find the "ordinary crimes" prosecution
an exception to the ne bis in idem doctrine may still motivate States to
strive for compliance with the Rome Statute to the best of their abilities.
IV. FINAL JUDGMENT RULE
The final judgment rule is another doctrine of federal courts with a
similar underpinning. While exhaustion doctrine applies to habeas
proceedings and is a collateral attack on state convictions, the final
judgment rule applies the same concept to the broader area of Supreme
Court appellate review of state court decisions. The final judgment rule
finds its statutory authority in 28 U.S.C. §1257, although the roots of
Supreme Court review goes further back.65
63. See Christine Van den Wyngaert and Tom Ongena, Ne bis in idem Principle, Including the
Issue ofAmnesty, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY
724-25 (Cassese et al, eds., 2002); LEILA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 190 (2002);
SCHABAS, supra note 5, at 88. But see BROOMHALL, supra note 9, at 91 (pointing to a situation in
which a case becomes admissible when the national laws, "be they definitions of crimes, general
principles, or defenses-define an area of responsibility markedly narrower than that provided for in the
Statute, allowing defacto impunity for acts punishable by the Court").
64. Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 20(3)(a)-(b).
65. Section 1291 also promotes the final judgment rule, but in the context of appeals from
federal district courts to courts of appeals. For purposes here, § 1257 is more relevant because "appeals
brought to the Supreme Court under section 1257 involve the transmission of cases or issues between
separate judicial systems. . . . (It] implicates the relationship between the states and the federal
government, and hence the special concerns of federalism and comity." Note, The Finality Rule for
Supreme Court Review of State Court Orders, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1004, 1012 (1978) [hereinafter Finality
Rule].
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The general power of the Supreme Court to review state court
decisions was granted by Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.66 The
Supreme Court, elaborating in cases like Martin v. Hunter's Lessee67 and
Murdock v. City of Memphis,68 clarified the nature of its appellate power.
Among the reasons for allowing such review, the Supreme Court pointed to
the fact that:
State attachments, state prejudices, state jealousies, and state
interests, might sometimes obstruct, or control, or be supposed to
obstruct or control, the regular administration of justice.... [I]n
controversies between ... a state and its citizens ... it enables
the parties, under the authority of congress, to have the
controversies heard, tried and determined before the national
tribunals.... This is not all. A motive of another kind, perfectly
compatible with the most sincere respect for state tribunals, might
induce the grant of appellate power over their decisions. That
motive is the importance, and even necessity of uniformity of
decisions throughout the whole United States, upon all subjects
within the purview of the constitution.
69
The ICC is faced with a similar dilemma when dealing with States.
Although the ICC is not an appellate court in relation to national courts, it is
in many ways the creation of the will of an international community that
wished to maintain some semblance of "uniformity" in the way the world
combats genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. In that respect,
the mandate of the Court may often involve seeing through the national
prejudices and jealousies to administer justice, although the ICC may not
possess the power to actually do so.7°
The very concerns that restrain the ICC from overreaching its
jurisdiction into areas of State sovereignty also appeared in Murdock.
Recognizing the vast reach appellate review would otherwise have over
state court decisions, the Supreme Court found, "[i]t cannot, therefore, be
maintained that it is in any case necessary for the security of the rights
claimed under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States that
the Supreme Court should examine and decide other questions not of a
66. An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, I Stat 73.
67. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
68. Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590 (1875).
69. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. at 347. Notice particularly the assumption that the judicial power
to review encompassed controversies between "a state and its citizens"--in the realm of Rome Statute
crimes, a large number of the most difficult cases will inevitably involve governments turning on their
own people, such as in Serbia, Sudan, etc.
70. See lontcheva Tumer, supra note 58, at 11-14.
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federal character.",71 This clever construction accomplishes the dual
purpose of restraining the Supreme Court from overreaching in its use of
appellate power by deferring to states on issues of state law, while
cementing the right of the Supreme Court to review federal issues.
While the ICC does not have the luxury of distinguishing a clear set of
supranational laws from national laws via which it can precisely follow the
rationales underpinning Martin or Murdock,72 it can, however, maintain a
better sense of when to defer by simply recognizing the very fact that it is
situated differently than the Supreme Court in Martin and Murdock. The
lack of clarity surrounding the law the ICC is supposed to be upholding and
the fact that the ICC is prevented from deferring on the basis of differences
in law,73 means that, even more than the Supreme Court, the ICC needs to
see how States interpret the alleged conduct through their own proceedings
before it makes any decisions, a goal which can be serviced by application
of a final judgment rule theory.74
The final judgment rule is, like the exhaustion doctrine in habeas
cases, just another manner of qualifying federal review to protect state
proceedings from needless interference.75 Whether for reasons of judicial
71. Murdock, 87 U.S. at 632-33.
72. Unlike the history and tradition upholding both federal and state law, the very existence of
international criminal law is ephemeral-it is an interstitial body of law in the space between.
international treaties and conventions, domestic criminal codes, transnational crime, and, now
increasingly, crimes of State. See BROOMHALL, supra note 9, at 9-24; M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW CONVENTIONS AND THEIR PENAL PROVISIONS 15-21 (M. Cherif
Bassiouni ed., 1997); Young, supra note 4, at 1190-91. The ICC cannot easily call upon the principles
of "international criminal law" to justify its need to intervene. The Court's mandate envisions its role in
setting an international standard for international criminal law. lontcheva Turner, supra note 58, at 4.
But the reality is that there is very little consensus about precisely what law the ICC is even clarifying.
73. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (for discussion on national prosecutions of
"ordinary crimes" and the idea that prosecution by a State on the basis of its national laws is not in and
of itself sufficient to render the case admissible for purposes of an ICC investigation).
74. Finality Rule, supra note 65, at 1013-14 ("By facilitating the development of alternative
grounds for the disposition of cases, the rule of finality under section 1257 permits the Court to avoid
unnecessary decision making.").
75. Id. at 1006 ("The entire case approach-with its corresponding finality rule-rests in part
upon the supposition that efficiency is best served by restricting appellate interruptions of the trial
process to an absolute minimum. By preserving the integrity of the trial, the rule of finality under the
entire case model [as opposed to the 'individual issue' model] obviously facilitates continuity and results
in a speedier disposition of the case. The finality rule also finds support in considerations other than
efficiency. The interests of litigants in securing justice is served when controversies are resolved in the
most expeditious fashion consistent with preserving the requirements of due process. Significantly.
from the standpoint of fairness to the parties, the prohibition of interlocutory appeals prevents dilatory
tactics by those litigants who can afford to subject their adversaries to attrition or who have an interest in
delaying completion of the trial."); See also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 477-78
(1975).
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efficiency, or comity and federalism,7 6 federal court deference to state
courts in anticipation of a final judgment is mirrored in the ICC relation to
national courts. The Rome Statute attempts to limit the number of appeals
and challenges to admissibility rulings, yet its need to maintain flexibility
allows, the Prosecutor a rolling basis on which to review admissibility
decisions.7  For example, if the ICC decided to defer to the Sudanese
government because the case was inadmissible in light of ongoing
investigations, the Prosecutor could after six months, if he felt there was
new evidence or a change that rendered the case admissible, reopen
admissibility proceedings for Darfur. If, however, the Court were to adhere
to a final judgment type of doctrine by waiting until a final national judg-
ment were rendered, the Court could preserve its legitimacy and authority
better because it would avoid a series of reversals in admissibility decisions.
V. ABSTENTION
Exhaustion of state remedies and the final judgment rule are just a few
analogous federal courts doctrine which might be applicable to justifying
ICC deference. The several abstention doctrines developed by federal
courts outline different reasons why federal courts are not to interfere with
state proceedings. Unlike the exhaustion doctrine, a type of collateral
attack which places the federal courts in a position of waiting for the final
state pronouncement, abstention is applicable when a motion for an
injunction of the state proceeding is filed in the federal court. In this light,
exhaustion might be more similar to the Court's application of ne bis in
idem which occurs after a national proceeding, while abstention is closer to
the Court's role before or during an investigation or prosecution. A closer
examination of the Younger abstention doctrine clarifies the similarities for
ICC jurisdiction.
In the broad realm of state and federal concurrent jurisdiction,
substantial overlap has required the development of rules of engagement for
federal courts.78 Abstention is a judicially-developed type of limitation on
federal court jurisdiction, the most relevant type of which is the Younger
76. Cox, 420 U.S. at 503-05 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
77. Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art., 18(3) ("The Prosecutor's deferral to a State's
investigation shall be open to review by the Prosecutor six months after the date of deferral or at any
time when there has been a significant change of circumstances based on the State's unwillingness or
inability genuinely to carry out the investigation."); Id. at art. 19(10) ("If the Court has decided that a
case is inadmissible under article 17, the Prosecutor may submit a request for a review of the decision
when he or she is fully satisfied that new facts have arisen which negate the basis on which the case had
previously been found inadmissible under article 17.").
78. See RICHARD FALLON et al., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1144-48 (5th ed. 2003).
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abstention.79 Also known as equitable restraint, it can be characterized as
the "judicially created bar to federal court interference with ongoing state
proceedings." 80 Sprouting from the Supreme Court decision in Younger v.
Harris and its companion cases,8' the doctrine of Younger abstention is
premised on notions of equity, comity and federalism. 82 When a state court
prosecution is pending, Younger calls for federal courts to refrain from
issuing injunctions, effectively giving deference to state jurisdiction.83
Younger was a necessary creation after federal courts found themselves
flooded with filings seeking injunctions of state court proceedings follow-
ing Dombrowski v. Pfister, a case in which the Supreme Court allowed for a
federal court injunction of a state court proceeding.84 Although there is
debate about the notion of comity which Younger embraces, 85 the idea
79. The Younger abstention is not precisely in the same category as the other abstentions such
as Pullman, Thibodaux or Burford. For purposes here, however, it will be considered a form of
abstention. See MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF
JUDICIAL POWER 281 (The Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1990) (1980).
80. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, at 796.
81. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Perez v.
Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216
(1971).
82. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44 (Justice Black writing, "courts of equity should not act, and
particularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate
remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. ... This underlying reason
for restraining courts of equity from interfering with criminal prosecutions is reinforced by an even more
vital consideration, the notion of 'comity,' that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of
the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance
of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to
perform their separate functions in their separate ways. This, perhaps for lack of a better and clearer
way to describe it, is referred to by many as 'Our Federalism."').
83. See Martha Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman
Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071, 1163-65 (1974) (comparing and pointing out that, unlike
the Pullman abstention in which the presumption is for federal jurisdiction, Younger presumes state
jurisdiction before it examines for special circumstances).
84. 380 U.S. 479 (1965). See Frank Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court
Proceedings: The Significance of Dombrowski, 48 TEX. L. REV. 535, 606 (1970) (pointing out the flood
of cases into federal courts).
85. 401 U.S. at 43-44 ("This underlying reason for restraining courts of equity from
interfering with criminal prosecutions is reinforced by an even more vital consideration, the notion of
'comity,' that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is
made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National
Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate
functions in their separate ways."); See also, FALLON et al., supra note 78, at 322-26 (citing the debate
about the existence, or lack of, parity between state and federal courts).
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works well in the ICC system, which lacks an appellate or hierarchical
structure.86
The overlap of ICC and national systems is precisely mirrored in the
system acknowledged by Younger and the application of federal abstention
is a very useful example for the ICC. If Darfur were to begin investigating
or prosecuting in response to the Security Council referral, according to the
theory of exhaustion of state remedies, the ICC should defer to Sudan's
proceedings and only after the conclusion of those proceedings would the
Court be eligible to review Darfur for admissibility. Under the Younger
abstention doctrine, however, the Court is justified in making a
determination to defer not because it must first defer to the national
proceedings, but because it chooses to leave the ongoing proceedings in the
national courts. A crucial outcome with a Younger abstention, however, is
that the federal decision to not interfere with the state proceeding
irrevocably leaves federal issues to be adjudicated in the state
proceedings. Although the ICC is not bound by a strict doctrine, it should
maintain an awareness that an application of a Younger-type justification
for a deferral to State jurisdiction leaves the Court open to criticism if it
later finds the State proceeding deficient in some way and delves into issues
already settled in the State proceedings.88
VI. EXCEPTIONS
Each doctrine mentioned so far can be utilized by the Court to support
its decisions to defer to national proceedings. Their usefulness, however, is
not limited to their positive application since the Court will face less
challenges for deferring to States than when it attempts to confront a State
with the determination that it is unwilling or unable to such an extent that
the ICC can intervene. The ICC can rely on any number of justifications
86. See HOLMES, supra note 11, at 673 ("[D]elegations were mindful that the ICC was not
envisaged as an appellate body to review decisions of domestic courts.").
87. Field, supra note 83, at 1164; see also Fallon et al., supra note 78, at 1227 ("In Younger
cases . . . the federal court dismisses the suit, and the underlying federal claims must typically be
adjudicated in the context of a state criminal case, subject only to Supreme Court review. As the Court
later held in Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980), the state court adjudication will have full res judicata
effect in subsequent federal court proceedings.").
88. This consideration is most relevant to a situation like Darfur in which the Security Council
referral balances the scale toward an ICC proceeding (some would say an investigation is mandatory).
See SCHABAS, supra note 5, at 12 (If an ICC investigation is already proceeding, the Prosecutor would
have to affirmatively justify under Article 53(2) why he wishes to halt the investigation. Otherwise, for
State Party referrals or exercises of the proprio motu power, if the Court has deferred to a State
proceeding under Article 18(2), then under 18(3) the Prosecutor may review the State proceedings after
six months or "at any time when there has been a significant change of circumstances based on the
State's unwillingness or inability genuinely to carry out the investigation.").
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for why a case is not admissible89 with the real difficulty being how to
justify why a case is admissible. These federal courts doctrines are
therefore most valuable to the ICCs complementarity scheme because they
all include exceptions that can be utilized in prescribing boundaries for the
ICCs vague standards for finding cases admissible. 90
Although the Rome Statute was intentionally written with flexible
language that would be acceptable to the greatest number of signatories,91
the resulting mix of objective and subjective standards leaves the Court
vulnerable. 9  The complementarity regime overall has an objective
procedure which allows for challenges, notification, deference, and ne bis in
idem among other provisions. Yet the criteria at the heart of the
admissibility determinations in Article 17 are premised on subjective
elements such as "substantial collapse"93 of the national judicial system or
"an intent to bring the person concerned to justice. 94  These subjective
elements imply discretionary implementation of the complementarity
regime, a situation mirrored in federal courts law.
Federal courts law has similarly encountered the realization that its
doctrines are not entirely rigid and that there is sometimes a need to
exercise discretion to make room for circumstances justifying exceptions-
the doctrines are within the jurisdictional reach of the federal courts, but the
89. Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 53(1)(c). This gives the Prosecutor discretion to take
into account "the gravity of the crime and the interests of the victims, [whether] there are nonetheless
substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice. As Prof
Shapiro has pointed out with regard to the federal system, the grant of jurisdiction does not impose an
obligation to exercise of jurisdiction at all times. See David Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60
N.Y.U. L. REv. 543 (1985).
90. Keep in mind that in an application of most of these exceptions, the ICC (embodied as the
ICC Prosecutor) acts in a role analogous to that of criminal defendants or civil plaintiffs in state courts
seeking federal review. This role, in turn, is in many respects as a proxy for victims who are otherwise
unable to seek any vindication of their rights. See David Donat-Cattin, The Role of Victims in the ICC
Proceedings, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT STATUTE 251
(Flavia Lattanzi, ed., 1998); CHRISTOPHER MUTTUKUMARU, Reparation to Victims, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS,
RESULTS 262 (1999).
91. See SADAT, supra note 63, at 119; HOLMES, National Courts versus the ICC, supra note
11, at 674, (for a discussion of the high degree of States' sensitivity to proposed terms such as
"ineffective," "diligently," and "good faith" that resulted in the term "genuinely" in Article 17); El
Zeidy, supra note 11, at 900.
92. HOLMES, supra note 9, at 75-76 (pointing out the subjective elements in all the criteria for
unwillingness as well as for the inability).
93. Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 17(3).
94. Id. at art. 17(2)(b).
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jurisdictional grant does not abolish exceptions. 95 Federal courts address
the discretionary nature of their doctrines by creating concomitant doctrines
of exceptions.
A. Exceptions to Exhaustion of State Remedies
Although exhaustion has been codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254, its roots
as a judicially created doctrine reveal the types of exceptions anticipated.
The Supreme Court from early on has presumed the exhaustion of state
remedies but for "cases of exceptional urgency., 96 When contemplating the
types of situations that qualified as cases of exceptional urgency, the
Supreme Court in U.S. ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler pointed to two cases
involving "interferences by the state authorities with the operations of
departments of the general government, and the other concerned the
delicate relations of that government with a foreign nation., 97 The Supreme
Court has accepted as part of the exhaustion doctrine that only rare cases of
peculiar urgency justify interference in state courts, 98 but these are
situations that can be analogized to ICC findings of admissibility.
According to Article 17(1) of the Rome Statute, exceptions to the
presumption of inadmissibility must meet the standard of unwilling or
unable to investigate or prosecute genuinely.99 Although standards for
unwilling and unable are spelled out in 17(2)-(3), they do not clearly
specify what might qualify as "shielding," "an intent to bring the person
concerned to justice," and "total or substantial collapse."' ° But looking at
cases justifying exceptions to exhaustion provide may provide some useful
considerations. 10 1 For example, In re Neagle,10 2 In re Loney,' °3 and Hunter
95. Shapiro, supra note 89, at 545, 574 ("Those who espouse the obligation theory of federal
jurisdiction frequently overlook or understate the range of situations in which the theory simply does not
accord with the facts.... [A]s experience and tradition teach, the question whether a court must exercise
jurisdiction and resolve a controversy on its merits is difficult, if not impossible to answer in gross....
Moreover, questions ofjurisdiction are of special concern to the courts because they intimately affect the
courts' relations with each other as well as with the other branches of government. Therefore, the
continued existence of measured authority to decline jurisdiction does not endanger, but rather protects,
the principle of separation of powers.").
96. United States ex rel. Kennedy, 269 U.S. at 18.
97. Id. at 19.
98. Exparte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114,117-18(1944).
99. Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 17(1).
100. Id. at art 17(2)-(3).
101. See Larry Yackle, The Exhaustion Doctrine in Federal Habeas Corpus: An Argument for a
Return to First Principles, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 393 (1983) (providing a look at the historic development of
the exhaustion doctrine).
102. See 135 U.S. 1 (1890) (concerning a deputy marshal discharged on habeas from state
custody for murdering an assailant in the performance of his duty to protect a justice of the court).
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v. Wood 1' 4 are cases in which exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine were
granted because the state proceedings were seen as impairing some aspect
of federal governance. Similarly, Wildenhus' Case'0 5 treats interference
with federal government treaty rights. These cases are probably most
analogous to any charges of shielding which the ICC may want to bring
against States. Although the fact pattern in the U.S. cases may be
completely opposite any situations faced by the ICC (e.g. In re Neagle
concerns a state wishing to prosecute while the federal government is
looking to pardon), the underlying theory for these situations is the
dominant or overriding federal interest. The ICC as charged with its
mandate to "put an end to impunity . . . and thus to contribute to the
prevention of such crimes ' 06 can claim an exception if the State's behavior
goes so far as to interfere with aspects of the Court's ability to attain those
goals.
Another class of exceptions to exhaustion doctrine consists of cases
"where the state remedy is seriously inadequate."' 0 7  This exception is
analogous to some situations in which the ICC is not able to point easily to
shielding or an intent to avoid justice. In Moore v. Dempsey, the Court did
not require exhaustion of state remedies if "the whole proceeding is a
mask-that counsel, jury and judge were swept to the fatal end by an
irresistible wave of public passion, and that the State Courts failed to
correct the wrongs, neither perfection in the machinery nor the possibility
that the trial court and counsel saw no other way of avoiding an immediate
outbreak of the mob can prevent this Court from securing to the petitioners
their constitutional rights."'0 8 Similarly, Mooney v. Holohan, although it
ultimately denied federal habeas on the grounds that a "corrective judicial
process" was available at the state level, found that deprivation of due
process via contrivances such as perjury or intimidation was unacceptable
and ultimately required correction. 0 9
103. See 134 U.S. 372 (1890) (concerning petitioner discharged on grounds that state
prosecution would impede and embarrass the administration ofjustice in a national tribunal).
104. See 209 U.S. 205 (1908).
105. 120 U.S. 1 (1887) (concerning a Belgian sailor who was discharged from state custody
because the arrest was contrary to an international treaty).
106. Rome Statute, supra note 8, at Preamble para. 5.
107. Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 692 (1948) (Reed, J. dissenting). See Exparte Hawk, 321
U.S. at 118 ("But where resort to state court remedies has failed to afford a full and fair adjudication of
the federal contentions raised ... a federal court should entertain his petition for habeas corpus, else he
would be remediless.").
108. 261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923).
109. 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) ("We deem it sufficient for the present purpose to say that we
are unable to approve this narrow view of the requirement of due process. That requirement, in
safeguarding the liberty of the citizen against deprivation through the action of the state, embodies the
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The ICC may find itself similarly situated in that national proceedings
may put on the appearance of following due process or standard procedures,
yet amount to a sham in reality. The cases of Moore, Mooney and Exparte
Hawk give some of the reasoning that can be used in justifying
admissibility for such a case. Moore provides an outline of a state
proceeding that may be affected by public perceptions or pressures. As
applied to the ICC in Darfur, imagine that the Sudanese government
conducts its own proceedings and proceeds to acquit several alleged
perpetrators. If the ICC were to find that the judges or jury (if applicable)
were daily critiqued in the newspapers or that there were frequent
demonstrations in the streets calling for acquittal of the defendants, the
Court might not be able to find that the national procedures were on their
face unwilling or unable or that there was an intentional shielding or
obstruction of justice. Yet the reality may be that the national proceedings
are unable to protect the validity of the outcome in light of external
pressures such that the proceedings are clearly unjust. The ICC might thus
be able to apply the Moore reasoning under Article 17(3) by attributing
such external interference to a "substantial collapse or unavailability" of the
national judiciary.
Mooney, on the other hand, points to a federal understanding of what
qualifies as due process as the standard by which the state courts must obey.
In the ICC context, due process and other disembodied legal principles that
are not uniformly accepted are extremely difficult to account for in any
admissibility review. Because each State has its own national legal system
which the ICC must respect and balance against the international
community's standards of justice, the ICC will always have a difficult time
pinning any admissibility exceptions on national procedural deficiencies.' 10
Concerns with this unsettled aspect of the ICCs jurisdictional reach has
already driven some countries to not ratify the treaty."' Wielding a
fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions.... It is a
requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and hearing if a state has contrived a
conviction through the pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant
of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be
perjured. Such a contrivance by a state to procure the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is as
inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like result by
intimidation.").
110. This is part of a larger and very complicated discussion which includes the placement of
amnesties within the purview of ICC jurisdiction. See Michael Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 507 (1999). The abuse of
alternative measures such as amnesty laws and proceedings in Chile and Cambodia on the one hand,
contrasted with the success of proceedings such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South
Africa on the other, only serves to highlight the difficulty in categorically deferring or being wary of
national proceedings.
111. Iontcheva Turner, supra note 58, at 8, n. 36.
[Vol. 13:3
Sheng
justification like Mooney provides, however, may drive other countries
closer to informal compliance. 12 But mostly Mooney will be helpful for
situations that are in the middle between total compliance and complete
rejection of any international standards to which the ICC subscribes (e.g.
torture)-where the State has exercised its jurisdiction but on "narrower
grounds than contemplated by the Statute ... allowing de facto impunity
for acts punishable by the Court."' 1 3 For example, the law in Sudan is a
mixture of customary law, Islamic shari'a law and democratic law in an
infant state. 14  Due process may be largely absent without minimal
protections such as a defendant's right to counsel." 5  If the Sudanese
government were to prosecute and acquit an alleged genocide perpetrator
through its normal process utilizing Sudanese judges and courts, the ICC on
review would likely find problems in the judicial process leading to an
unjust result despite the procedural perfection. The ICC may have a
difficult task pronouncing the subtleties of the Sudanese system to be
outright corruption as opposed to part of its customary law heritage. So
how does the Court tactfully avoid passing judgment on the intact judiciary
of a country that does not confess to a total or even substantially collapsed
judicial system? The Court cannot make admissibility decisions on the
basis of outcomes in a way that effectively pushes States to litigate toward a
certain end, and yet it cannot state that the intact judicial system of one
nation does not administer justice in a way that is equal to the way another
nation does. Following the Mooney approach effectively upholds the
presumption of deference to national proceedings while making it known
that the national proceedings, though not inferior or lacking, may have
made an error in the particular instance requiring a "corrective judicial
process to remedy the alleged wrong."'" 6 The advantage of the Mooney
format is thus when a State brings a case within its normal parameters,
which may be narrower grounds than the Court ultimately requires such that
a patently unjust result occurs, the Court experiences no need to pronounce
the national government as unable according to Article 17(3), but can say
the State is unwilling if it does not provide the "corrective judicial process."
112. See BROOMHALL, supra note 9, at 89-90.
113. Id.at91.
114. See AHARON LAYISH AND GABRIEL WARBURG, THE REINSTATEMENT OF ISLAMIC LAW IN
SUDAN UNDER NUMAYRI (Ruud Peters & Bernard Weiss 2002); ADIB HALASA, JOHN COOKE, AND
USTINIA DOLGOPOL, THE RETURN TO DEMOCRACY IN SUDAN: REPORT OF A MISSION ON BEHALF OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS (1986); JOHN WUOL MAKEC, THE CUSTOMARY LAW OF
THE DINKA PEOPLE OF SUDAN (ed., 1988).
115. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, SUDAN: ATTACKS ON THE JUDICIARY (Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights 1991).
116. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. at 113.
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The exceptions to habeas exhaustion doctrine have been codified in 28
U.S.C. § 2254(b) as well. In relevant part, § 2254 reads:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted unless it appears that (A) the applicant has exhausted the
remedies available in the courts of the State; or (B)(i) there is an
absence of available State corrective process; or (ii)
circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect
the rights of the applicant."
7
The Supreme Court has read this to mean that an exception to
exhaustion will be made "only if there is no opportunity to obtain redress in
state court or if the corrective process is so clearly deficient as to render
futile any effort to obtain relief."'"18 An example of this was Wilwording v.
Swenson, a case in which the Supreme Court allowed an exception to the
exhaustion doctrine because the state court had never granted a hearing on
the issues being litigated in the instant case in other similar cases-the
existence of corrective proceedings was therefore meaningless.' 19
As applied to the ICC, exception (B)(i) could be made analogous to an
unable claim under Article 17(2) while exception (B)(ii) would be
analogous to unwilling according to Article 17(3), although Wilwording and
Duckworth lead to the belief that the two categories can actually be
collapsed into one if the national proceedings, though available, are so
egregious that they become equivalent to an absence of further corrective
proceedings. Applying the exceptions under § 2254 in this way thus takes
the ICC one step further towards an admissibility finding by declaring
whatever national remedies exist will be insufficient to fulfill the Rome
Statute's definition. In defining those standards, the ICC could look to the
reasoning given in Wilwording-the complete absence in the state's history
of ever proceeding in the way the Supreme Court considered corrective.
Similarly, if the national court of Sudan claimed that it had an appeal
process but had never in its history actually completed an appeal, that
would provide the ICC with enough reason to find admissibility grounds in
the same way the Supreme Court did in Wilwording. Part of this analysis is
thus comparison to the State's previous practices in order to determine if
the State exhibits a pattern of such behavior. 1
20
117. State Custody; Remedies in Federal Courts, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (1996).
118. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981). See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, at 887.
119. 404U.S.249(1971).
120. The advantage of seeking out a pattern in another application is that if the Court is able to
determine that the State normally proceeds in a particular pattern, but in the instant case veers from its
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B. Exceptions to Final Judgment Rule
As codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1257, the final judgment rule provides,
"[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in
which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by
writ of certiorari. . . ." Controversy over what constitutes a final
judgment' 2 1 or what it means to be the highest court in which a decision can
be made 122 has rendered the final judgment rule subject to many exceptions.
The most coherent treatment of the nature of exceptions to the finality rule
came in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn.123 Coming after a string of cases
in which exceptions for non-final cases were made, 124 Cox attempted to sort
the types of cases justifying exceptions into four broad categories. 25
The four categories are generally further divided into two groups: the
first two types of exceptions pertain to cases in which the federal issue
survives further proceedings, and the second two classes of exceptions
relate to cases in which the federal issue may be mooted but review is
nonetheless justified. 26  The first two are perceived as reasonable and
practical exceptions in light of the finality rule, while the second two are
seen as an expansive interpretation of the Supreme Court's power to
override the final judgment rule. 127  In the ICC context, however, the
exceptions are not divided in the same way because realistically, there is no
clear ICC law that can be distinguished from national laws such that
survival of an ICC issue is ever a real basis for intervening in a State
process. The ICC is evaluating for issues of unwillingness or inability
according to Article 17(2)-(3), so the relevant comparison is about how the
normal course, the Court has a stronger case against the State for unwillingness on the basis of shielding
or an intent to avoid justice. See Holmes, supra note 11, at 675.
121. See Catlin v. U.S., 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (stating that "final" means when the judgment
or decree "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the
judgment.").
122. See, e.g., Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960) (finding the Police Court to
be the highest court by virtue of a procedural limitation); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
123. See 420 U.S. 469. The verdict may be out on whether the exceptions have become so
scattered or unclear as to have rendered the Cox categories archaic or to have overtaken the actual
finality rule itself. See Finality Rule, supra note 65, at 1004-05 ("the cumulative effect of these ad hoc
exceptions to the rule of finality is a rather confusing common law of appellate jurisdiction."); REDISH,
supra note 79, at 247. For purposes here, the Cox categories are still useful in illustrating the types of
exceptions.
124. See Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120 (1945); Local No. 438 Constr. and
Gen. Laborers' Union v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1963); Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555
(1963).
125. Cox Broad Corp., 420 U.S. 469.
126. Id.
127. Finality Rule, supra note 65, at 1015.
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finality exceptions can help define the State's unwillingness or inability.
For the most part, though, these exceptions may be more useful for
borderline cases that are more diplomatically handled under Article 17(3)'s
inability standard where there is no indication of a State's blatant
unwillingness through shielding or impartial proceedings, situations which
would surely generate other more obvious evidence allowing admissibility.
In the first category are "those cases in which there are further
proceedings-even entire trials-yet to occur in the state courts but where
for one reason or another the federal issue is conclusive or the outcome of
further proceedings preordained. In these circumstances, because the case
is for all practical purposes concluded, the judgment of the state court on
the federal issue is deemed final. ,,28 This class of cases might be
considered relatives of the second class of exceptions under § 2254(b) in
which the existence of a corrective process is irrelevant because the process
is, "as a practical matter,"' 29 concluded. This typically involves a case in
which there is no further defense based on state law and the state has
already ruled against any defense based on a federal issue. In the federal
context, these types of cases are most important when there is a
constitutional right which risks being diminished by further delay. In the
ICC context, however, since there are no analogous supranational rights to
vindicate, this type of exception is probably most comparable to cases of
procedural rulings resulting in procedural limitations.13 For example, if the
courts in Sudan had a process in which a lower judge ruled that crucial
testimony of certain witnesses, without which acquittal would be
guaranteed, could not be taken and this kind of ruling would be carried
through all further national proceedings, the Court might look at that as a
case in which, for all practical purposes, the national proceedings were
final. The implication toward the State would be that, of several options
available, it chose the worst one that now prevents further proceedings from
being meaningful. Such a ruling would not necessarily imply an intent on
the part of the government to shield or prevent justice, although it might be
very likely, so this scenario might be perceived as placing the ICC in the
uncomfortable position of passing judgment on the validity of a national
proceeding. But by limiting the finality exception to just one issue (e.g. the
ruling in the particular case regarding admission of testimony) and framing
it as a choice the State made although it had other options, the ICC might be
able to avoid the accusation that it is passing judgment on an entire national
128. Cox Broad Corp., 420 U.S. at 479. Cox cites Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) and
Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971) (as illustrative of this category). See also
Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989).
129. Finality Rule, supra note 65, at 1015.
130. The limitation would be some sort of restraint on the government's ability to prosecute
further, not the defendant's available defenses.
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system while still being able to contend that, on that one issue, because of
"unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to
obtain ... the necessary evidence and testimony."' 3 ' The ICC can thus
make the argument, if not under unwillingness standards, then under the
unavailability standard of Article 17(3).
The second category of Cox exceptions involve cases "in which the
federal issue, finally decided by the highest court in the State, will survive
and require decision regardless of the outcome of future state-court
proceedings."'' 32 As examples of this category, the Cox court pointed to
Brady v. Maryland133 and Radio State WOW, Inc. v. Johnson,1 4 and the
recent case of NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. 135 also fits this category.
Applied to the ICC, this category is very difficult to analogize because of
the inability of the ICC to recognize Rome Statute crimes as more
legitimate than "ordinary crimes" in national laws-although the ICC has
specified certain conduct as genocide or crimes against humanity, the same
conduct can be tried by a national judiciary as an ordinary crime that may
not carry the same sentencing or consequences as a Rome Statute crime.
This category of exceptions basically requires a decision by the ICC that no
matter what the State does, it will leave an issue unresolved which will
require the ICCs intervention. Even more strongly than the first category,
this type of exception requires the Court to make a judgment about the
capability of the national courts to fully handle a prosecution. A
hypothetical case would consist of the highest Sudanese court remanding a
murder case to a lower court for further proceedings only on a perjury issue.
If the ICC felt that the further State proceedings would not affect the
acquittal on the murder charges, it would still have trouble justifying
intervention on those grounds. The ICC would have trouble proving
admissibility on a State's final judgment, much less justifying interference
as an exception to the final judgment rule-intervening because the Court
feels the acquittal was the wrong decision and would be very difficult to
defend. Although the first category of Cox exceptions does tend to
131. Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 17(3).
132. 420 U.S. at 480.
133. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (Supreme Court granting review when case was
remanded solely for issue of the defendant's punishment despite the defendant's challenge of the
prosecutor's actions as unconstitutional because regardless of the outcome of the punishment issue, the
defendant would still be entitled to an appeal based on the constitutional issue. The constitutional issue
was independent of the events at the punishment proceedings.).
134. Radio Station WOW, Inc., 326 U.S. 120 (finding that the federal issue would survive the
state proceedings which remanded only for determination of damages).
135. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (Supreme Court granting review
for case in which Mississippi Court remanded case to trial court on the issue of damages because the
federal law issues would not be resolved in further state court proceedings).
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characterize the State's further proceedings as mere formality, it leaves
open the possibility that the national system is still valid but merely unable
to reach the needed result in this particular instance. This second category,
however, requires a more blatant characterization of the State's system as
wrong-or inadequate to prosecute Rome Statute types of crimes altogether,
a depiction the ICC would be wise not to adopt.
• Cox's third category includes "those situations where the federal claim
has been finally decided, with further proceedings on the merits in the state
courts to come, but in which later review of the federal issue cannot be had,
whatever the ultimate outcome of the case."' 36  Citing California v.
Stewart137 and North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug
Stores, Inc.,' 3 Cox allows for federal interference before a final state
judgment when the federal issue will be permanently lost if the, case
proceeds in state courts. In the context of the ICC in Sudan, this might
translate into a case in which Sudan is attempting to prosecute a defendant
for genocide based on Rome Statute guidelines, but in the course of its
proceedings, makes a ruling that certain evidence of mass sterilization
cannot be collected. If the case for genocide proceeded in the national
system on some other grounds, the ICC may never have a chance to
prosecute the alleged conduct of mass sterilization and the perpetrators may
never be tried for that particular conduct at all. This third category of
exceptions can thus be characterized as allowing the ICC to intervene when
State procedural barriers prevent proceedings on issues relevant to the ICCs
realm of interest, and while ICC intervention will undoubtedly stir debate, it
is likely less than if it claimed a right to intervene over an area of
substantive State law.' 39  The ICC in this exception creates a bubble for
itself if it uses this type of exception to preserve issues relevant to the
Court, and if it does so by pointing to a deficiency in the state's procedural
process. This would qualify under Article 17(3) as an inability on the part
136. CoxBroad Corp., 420 U.S. at481.
137. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (the Supreme Court citing a state court judgment
as final because "acquittal of the defendant at trial would preclude, under state law, an appeal by the
state.").
138. North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156 (1973)
(the Supreme Court finding that the issue of whether a North Dakota law was constitutional needed to be
decided before the case proceeded in state courts or else the constitutional issue would never be
addressed).
139. Finality Rule, supra note 65, at 1021-22 (although "the Court will generally give effect to
reasonable rules of state procedure... [b]ut since the independent and adequate state grounds doctrine
as applied to state procedural law rests primarily upon considerations of comity--as opposed to a
congressional statute, which underlies the doctrine as applied to state substantive law--the Court need
not observe state procedural law as scrupulously as it must state substantive grounds.").
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of the State, while not imputing to the State an intentional shielding or
intent to avoid justice.
The last Cox category of exceptions is by far the most confusing. In. its
distilled form, "interlocutory review is permitted (1) when 'reversal of the
state court on the federal issue would be preclusive of any further litigation
on the relevant cause of action,' and (2) when failure to consider the state
court decision immediately 'might seriously erode federal policy.""' 140 The
Cox opinion cites Curry, Langdeau, and Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo141 as the cases most reflective of this category of exception. This
class is very similar to the third category except that in that category, the
Supreme Court intervenes because it is the only certain time at which it
might be. able to review the issue. The fourth category, however, includes
exceptions for when review might be had later as well. 42  This
characteristic tends to shift category four exceptions toward an "individual
issue model" in which the Supreme Court chooses to review independent
issues that it deems important to federal interests. 143 Although the ICC may
find this type of exception useful, it needs to be careful that reviewing a
State proceeding mostly because it serves an important ICC interest may
come too close to creating an unwelcome hierarchy. While the other three
categories of exceptions to finality doctrine rely on circumstances in which
the ICC may step in because the State is proving unwilling or unable, this
category seems to indicate situations in which the Court is even admitting
that the State may still be willing or able. This exception within the federal-
state system is already tenuous, 44 but applied to the ICC-State system in
which the supranational-national law distinction is not very clear, this
exception is probably unfeasible.
C. Exceptions to Abstention Doctrine
Abstention is an exercise of judicial restraint when all "jurisdictional
and justiciabilty requirements are met. ' 14' Although there are different
theories as to how or why the federal courts should issue injunctions, 46 the
allowance for judicial restraint in light of state proceedings has been
140. Id. at 1023-24.
141. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
142. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, at 676.
143. Finality Rule, supra note 65, at 1006-07, 1025-26.
144. REDISH, supra note 79, at 254-55.
145. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, at 761.
146. For example, the Anti-Injunction Act was a statutory prohibition on federal court
injunctions in state proceedings, with which some critics the Younger abstention as needlessly
interfering. See Martin Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial
Function, 94 YALE L. J. 71 (1984).
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strongly imbued in the federal judicial system. 147  Exceptions to this
presumption of deference must therefore battle an overarching systemic
goal of promoting the interests of comity and federalism. Naturally, the
few circumstances that can justify a breach of the deference presumption
are extreme situations. Transferred into the ICC context, these are
situations more relevant to a finding of unwillingness under Article 17(2),
as opposed to inability under Article 17(3). Additionally, because the ICC
does not have the ability to actually enjoin State proceedings, the equivalent
of an injunction or declaratory relief would be determination that a case
fulfills the Rome Statute's admissibility requirements. Lastly, the situations
that qualify as exceptions under an abstention theory, unlike the exceptions
to the final judgment rule, are not borderline instances of State mishandling
which may involve merely inability without negative intent-rather; these
are examples of clear State misconduct embodying a high level of
intentional misconduct.
The Supreme Court in Younger imagined that abstention would apply
in all cases except for "exceptional circumstances" in which case the federal
courts could exercise their jurisdiction. 148 This reasoning closely tracks the
explanation given in exhaustion doctrine, which cites "circumstances of
peculiar urgency" as the only exceptions to the presumption of deference to
states. 149 The emphasis on how extreme these situations need to be mirrors
the presumption which the Rome Statute places on the Court-that a case is
considered inadmissible unless the Court can prove one of the situations
justifying an exception.
Bad faith state prosecutions constitute the first type of exception
recognized by the court in Younger. 50 The embodiment of this exception
was given by the example of Dombrowski v. Pfister, a case in which the
state prosecutors utilized the courts for the purpose of harassing and
intimidating civil rights activists as "part of a plan to employ arrests,
seizures, and threats of prosecution under color of the statutes to harass
appellants and discourage them and their supporters from asserting and
attempting to vindicate the constitutional rights of Negro citizens of
Louisiana. 1 51 In distinguishing Younger from Dombrowski, the Supreme
Court noted that Dombrowski did "sufficiently establish the kind of
irreparable injury, above and beyond that associated with the defense of a
single prosecution brought in good faith that had always been considered
the very restricted circumstances under which an injunction could be
147. Shapiro, supra note 89, at pp. 545-52.
148. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Cmty., 420 U.S. at 53-54.
149. United States ex rel. Kennedy, 269 U.S. at 17.
150. Younger, 401 U.S. at 48-49.
151. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479,482 (1965).
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justified."' 5 2 The Supreme Court further elaborated, however, that "even
irreparable injury is insufficient unless it is 'both great and immediate." 53
Although Younger itself did not qualify for an exception as a bad faith
prosecution and no case since then has qualified for such an exception,
theoretically a case of bad faith prosecution resulting in great and
immediate irreparable injury would qualify.
In a scenario involving the ICC, a bad faith prosecution on the part of
the State would not be a case of harassment, but rather of excessive
leniency for the defendant(s). The Court would not be aligned with the
interests of parties who are being harassed, but rather with hypothetical
petitioners (e.g. victims) asking for an injunction of the national
proceedings based on claims of irreparable injury. Such a showing would
fulfill the Article 17(2) definition of unwillingness because it would be a
prosecution brought to shield a defendant, or unjustifiably delay or conduct
an impartial hearing with an intent to avoid bringing the defendant to
justice.154 The usefulness of the Dombrowski example is that it specifies
what level of injury from the bad faith prosecution is needed to justify
intervention since the Rome Statute itself is vague as to any methods of
measurement (e.g. what qualifies as shielding). In an ICC application of the
rationale, the burden placed on the appellants in Dombrowski to prove their
allegations of irreparable injury transfers to the ICC such that it must prove
great and immediate irreparable injury. Of course, the injury in an ICC case
is not to the defendants who are benefiting from the leniency of the national
courts. The Court will have to act as a proxy for a combination of victims'
interests and the interest of the international community in order to show
some type of injury resulting from the State's bad faith prosecution.'55
Particularly in the case of Darfur, the Security Council referral expressed
the very specific wishes of the entire international community embodied in
the UN," such that claiming an injury to the expressed interests of at least
152. Younger, 401 U.S. at 48.
153. Id. at 46.
154. Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 20(3). This article on ne bis in idem also touches on
these standards of shielding and independent or impartial proceedings. The abstention doctrine,
however, is more relevant to an Article 17 analogy because abstention occurs before the state court has
completed its proceedings, while ne bis in idem is concerned with evaluation after conviction or
acquittal, a doctrine more similar to exhaustion or final judgment.
155. There are various theories which designate the Court as the nexus of international interest
in preventing the core crimes. See SADAT, supra note 63, at 47-75; BROOMHALL, supra note 9, at 42-
43; TRIFFTERER, supra note 9, at 23-32.
156. See CONDORELLI AND VILLALPLANDO, Can the Security Council Extend the ICC's
Jurisdiction?, in THE ROME STATUE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY
627-40 (Antonio Cassese et. al. eds., 2002).
2007] Sheng
ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
the international community, if not the victims of the alleged crimes, should
not be difficult to fathom.
. How to show an injury, however, is not readily apparent when there is
a lack of a real petitioner. The Court's representation of hypothetical
interests would still need to rely on proof of an irreparable injury to
someone. For example, if the Sudanese prosecution were conducted in bad
faith, the ICC could allege a "great and immediate" irreparable injury to 1)
the claims of victims who may lose their chance to press charges against the
perpetrators, 2) victims who are continuing to suffer at the hands of
janjaweed militia due to a lack of good faith prosecution, and/or 3) the
international community's ability to prevent Rome Statute crimes from
occurring or to secure good faith trials through its referral process. The
scope of the harm would need to be proven the way the appellants in
Dombrowski
Had offered to prove that their offices had been raided and all
their files and records seized pursuant to search and arrest
warrants that were later summarily vacated by a state judge for
lack of probable cause. They also offered to prove that despite
the state court order quashing the warrants and suppressing the
evidence seized, the prosecutor was continuing to threaten to
initiate new prosecutions of appellants under the same statutes,
was holding public hearings at which photostatic copies of the
illegally seized documents were being used, and was threatening
to use other copies of the illegally seized documents to obtain
grand jury indictments against the appellants on charges of
violating the same statutes.
These types of allegations transferred to an ICC context might
translate into repeated summary judgments dismissing consecutive claims
against the defendant, continuing use of perjured testimony, ongoing threats
of prosecution aimed at witnesses or victims, and other acts indicating
perpetual violation of the victims' and international community's interest in
a good faith prosecution. Framing the unwillingness standards in the
Dombrowski manner, as an exception to normal abstention doctrine, enables
the Court to utilize vocabulary such as irreparable injury, and add
dimensions such as "great and immediate," to fill in the blanks left by
Article 17(2).
Another fruitful manner of applying the Younger bad faith exception is
by examining which cases the Supreme Court designated as falling short of
the Dombrowski level of bad faith. Since the federal courts have not
granted a single bad faith exception post-Younger, the body of non-
157. Younger, 401 U.S. at 48.
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qualifying cases proves more relevant to defining which cases may
qualify.1' For example, in Hicks v. Miranda, the Supreme Court refused to
find bad faith or harassment through repeated seizures of the movie "Deep
Throat" because the actions were conducted according to authorizing
judicial orders. 159 This hints at the idea that proof of the bad faith has to run
from top to bottom, showing an intention to harass at every level. This is
similar to Juidice v. Vail, another case in which the Supreme Court found
that the lack of bad faith on the part of the judges issuing the orders
nullified the allegations of bad faith that would allow for an exception.
160
The ICC might thereby want to focus, in addition to the overall nature of
the prosecution, on alleging and proving bad faith on the part of the judges'
or judiciary bodies' intent to enforce judicial orders "motivated by desire to
harass or ... conducted in bad faith.'
61
Younger's second category of exception to abstention doctrine is for
statutes that "might be flagrantly and patently violative of express
constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in
whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply
it."91 62  This class of exceptions may be almost extinct in federal courts
today after Trainor v. Hernandez, in which the Supreme Court reversed a
lower court finding that a state statute was violative of the due process
clause without clarifying whether an unconstitutional statute would still
justify an exception to abstention. 163 The ICC, however, need only explore
whether the original reasoning behind this exception is applicable to the
Court's burden of proving unwillingness. A comparable case in the Darfur
scenario would be if Sudan passed a statute which declared all defendants
charged with crimes prior to March 3, 2005 (the date on which the Security
Council referred Darfur to the ICC 164) either immune or pardoned.
Discussions about the nature of amnesties or pardons in relation to
admissibility generally tend to recognize the admissibility of cases in which
amnesty was doled out either during a proceeding or as the conclusion of a
158. Within the federal courts, the criterion needed to grant this exception have proven to be
extremely narrow. See FALLON et al., supra note 78, at 1227. The bad faith exception might be
characterized as encompassing only those cases with "repeated prosecutions initiated by state officials
solely for the purpose of harassment without the opportunity to raise the claims in state court because of
the unavailability or bias of the state judiciary." See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, at 832.
159. 422 U.S. 332 (1975). Unlike Dombrowski, in which the continuing threats included the
use of illegally seized documents, Hicks does not provide a showing of illegality.
160. 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
161. Id. at 326.
162. Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54 (citing Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 485-86 (1941)).
163. 431 U.S. 434 (1977).
164. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Referes Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to
Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. SC/8351 (Mar. 3, 2005).
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proceeding, but recognize the limitation of the Rome Statute in reaching
instances of amnesties or pardons post-conviction. 65 Based on Article 17,
the assumption is that amnesties granted during the course of a proceeding
automatically qualifies the trial as a "sham trial.' 66 The Younger exception
rationale can bolster this presumption by pinpointing any specific
legislation authorizing blanket amnesties or immunities and providing
supplemental support for its dismissal. 67  For cases of post-conviction
measures, the Younger exception could become useful if it was able to
indicate a piece of legislation rendering a broad swath of immunity or
pardons such that compared to prior patterns of legislative enactment
pursuant to a judgment, the new statute indicates blatant disregard for the
standards exacted in the Rome Statute. As such, this Younger exception
provides another basis on which to compare national proceedings against
their own histories, even if, in the end, the rarity of amnesties or pardons
through statutory means will render this exception minimally useful.
The third Younger exception includes a few sub-topics encompassed in
the broader category of situations in which the state lacks an adequate
forum to adjudicate the issue. The reason can be bias or a finding that the
state courts fail to offer an adequate remedy. 68 Younger does not seem to
explicitly lay out the boundaries of this third exception such that the
confirmation of the exception's existence consists of the subsequent cases
which presume the exception, yet the inadequate state forum exception is
the most substantial of the exceptions stemming from Younger. 69 Gibson
165. Amnesties granted during a trial can contribute to a finding of admissibility based on
unwillingness, while amnesties and pardons granted in place of a trial do not bar the ICC under the ne
bis in idem principle since they do not qualify as judgments. See VAN DEN WYNGAERT AND ONGENA,
supra note 63, at 726-27; BROOMHALL, supra note 9, at 100-102; SADAT, supra note 63, at 53-69.
166. VAN DEN WYNGAERT AND ONGENA, supra note 63, at 726. See also BROOMHALL, supra
note 9, at 94-96 ("Amnesties typically remain a tribute paid, in negotiations, to the fact of present
power, and their acceptability under any circumstances remains controversial.").
167. Exceptions such as the creation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South
Africa highlight the difficulty of the presumption that all amnesties lead to sham trials inconsistent with
the goals of the Rome Statute. See BROOMHALL, supra note 9, at 101; SADAT, supra note 63, at 59-69.
168. Younger, 401 U.S. at 45 (citing Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243-44 (1926) ("[C]ases
have established the doctrine that, when absolutely necessary for protection of constitutional rights,
courts of the United States have power to enjoin state officers from instituting criminal actions. But this
may not be done, except under extraordinary circumstances, where the danger of irreparable loss is both
great and immediate. Ordinarily, there should be no interference with such officer .... The accused
should first set up and rely upon his defense in the state courts, even though this involves a challenge of
the validity of some statute, unless it plainly appears that this course would not afford adequate
protection.").
169. Brian Stagner, Avoiding Abstention: The Younger Exceptions, 29 TEX. TECH L. REv. 137,
163--64 (1998).
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v. Berryhill was one of the earliest cases to utilize this third exception., 70 In
Gibson, the plaintiffs complained that the Alabama Board of Optometry
suffered from an incurable bias that prevented it from providing them with
a "fair and impartial hearing in conformity with due process of law."'' The
Supreme Court agreed that the state proceedings were biased based on the
fact that "those with substantial pecuniary interest in legal proceedings
should not adjudicate these disputes," and possibly also because the Board
may have a prejudicial notion against the plaintiffs already. 72 The federal
branch's willingness to intervene, however, is circumscribed somewhat by
Kugler v. Helfant, a case in which the state rules allowing for judicial
recusal was a sufficient safeguard against system-wide bias such that it was
not shown that the overall state court system could not provide an unbiased
process.173
Transplanted into the ICC context, the Gibson rationale requires a
showing by the Court that the national proceedings suffer from a bias (such
as substantial pecuniary gain) so severe that it pervades the whole system,
or that the ruling parties in the proceedings had previously engaged in
behavior indicative of their predetermined disposition (such as an attorney
who formerly defended the defendant sitting as a judge). The Court in
making the case for a showing of unwillingness thus needs to focus both on
showing that the national system overall does not have sufficient safeguards
to guarantee an unbiased system, not just one or two unbiased judges, and
on proving that the judges or administering bodies have substantial stakes in
the outcome of the case.
The second aspect of the inadequate state forum exception is based on
whether the state proceeding is able to provide a remedy. The Supreme
Court addressed this in Gerstein v. Pugh, a case in which the federal courts,
referring only briefly to Younger, held that:
Relief was not barred by the equitable restrictions on federal
intervention in state prosecutions. . . .The injunction was not
directed at the state prosecutions as such, but only at the legality
of pretrial detention without a judicial hearing, an issue that could
not be raised in defense of the criminal prosecution. The order to
hold preliminary hearings could not prejudice the conduct of the
trial on the merits. 174
170. 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
171. Id. at 570.
172. Id. at 579.
173. 421 U.S. 117 (1975).
174. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 108 n.9 (1975).
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This reading of the exception recalls the second class of exceptions
under the final judgment rule-the survival of an important federal interest
which the state has no way of adequately addressing. As in that context, the
application of this rationale to an ICC situation is tricky because the lack of
a state remedy is not clearly grounds for intervention. For example, Sudan
has a provision allowing use of force to resist an illegal warrant for arrest.
175
If a defendant killed many people but claimed this provision as a defense
and the State found the claim reasonable, the ICC may find itself unable to
point to any unwillingness or inability other than the fact that the national
law is different than the Rome Statute. Unless the state provisions are in
some way applied with bias or in such a way as to cause great irreparable
injury, the usefulness of the Gerstein manner of evaluation may not prove
very useful for the ICC.
The lack of an adequate state remedy is, however, different from the
complete absence of a state proceeding. Although this is not strictly an
exception to abstention doctrine, the Supreme Court was quick to point out
that Younger abstention principles are not applicable to a situation in which
the state is not conducting proceedings. In Steffel v. Thompson, the
Supreme Court specifically found,
When no state criminal proceeding is pending at the time the
federal complaint is filed, considerations of equity, comity, and
federalism on which Younger v. Harris, and Samuels v. Mackell
... were based, have little vitality: federal intervention does not
result in duplicative legal proceedings or disruption of the state
criminal justice system; nor can federal intervention, in that
circumstance, be interpreted as reflecting negatively upon the
state courts' ability to enforce constitutional principles.
Effectively stripping the federal courts of any need to justify federal
action, the Steffel rationale applied to the ICC is similar to one of the initial
complementarity propositions-that the ICC faces no obstacle in an
"inaction scenario."'177 As discussed earlier, once a State decides to initiate
its own proceedings, the ICC will in almost every situation need to defer to
the State proceedings unless or until the Court can prove an exception to the
inadmissibility presumption. Steffel is simply another theory to bolster the
Court's initial right to intervene.
Another tangent of exceptions to Younger abstention is the fact that a
state may waive its right to argue for the application of abstention principles
175. ABDALLA HASSAN SALIM, RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED IN THE SUDAN 15 (Mohamed Omer
Beshir & Maureen Mekki eds., 1983).
176. 415 U.S. 452, 453 (1974).
177. Complementarity in Practice, supra note 33, at 7.
[Vol. 13:3
Sheng
and thereby voluntarily submit to a federal forum. The Supreme Court
found in Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, "[i]f the State
voluntarily chooses to submit to a federal forum, principles of comity do
not demand that the federal court force the case back into the State's own
system."' 178  Similarly, the majority of the ICCs jurisdiction is built on a
foundation of State consent.17 9 Under Article 13(a) and (c) respectively, the
Court may exercise its jurisdiction if the situation is referred by a State
Party (that possesses jurisdiction over the matter initially) or if the
Prosecutor uses his proprio motu powers. 8 ° Both of these scenarios require
the State's acceptance of the Court's exercise of jurisdiction 81 and are
therefore theoretically analogous to voluntary waivers of Younger
abstention. The voluntary waiver, however, can be used not only to allow
federal court proceedings, but even to urge the federal system to take over
the case. 82 In drafting the Rome Statute, nobody contemplated that States
would so willingly refer cases to the Court because State sovereignty
interests were so high. 83 The worry now is that national courts, in referring
their cases voluntarily, will actually be doing so to the detriment of the
underlying principles of complementarity. The presumption of deference to
State proceedings underscores the intention of the Rome Statute to create a
system in which States do not shirk their duty to prosecute the core
crimes. The Court's continued acceptance of self-referral cases waiving
complementarity, while necessary if the need for investigation and
prosecution exists, may undercut the effectiveness of national regimes. The
ICC must be aware of the likelihood that States may take advantage of the
fact that they can waive their primary jurisdiction and proceed to a
'selective or asymmetrical self-referral' where the de jure government is
itself party to an internal armed conflict.' 85 In such a situation, the Court
needs to be aware of the politics at stake and adhere to its duty to
178. 431 U.S. 471,480(1977).
179. Article 12(1) declares that "[a] State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts
the jurisdiction of the court with respect to the crimes referred to in article 5." See Lattanzi, supra note
90, at 6-7.
180. Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 13(a) and (c).
181. Hans-Peter Kaul, Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction, in THE ROME STATUE AND
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 606 (Antonio Cassese et al., eds., 2002).
182. Stagner, supra note 169, at 176-77.
183. Claus Kress, Self-Referrals and Waivers of Complementarity: Some Considerations in Law
andPolicy, 2 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 944, 944-45 (2004).
184. Rome Statute, supra note 8, at Preamble para. 6 ("Recalling that it is the duty of every
State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.").
185. Kress, supra note 183, at 946-47. See also Broomhall, supra note 13, at 80 ("States
Parties may for a variety of reasons sometimes prefer that jurisdiction is exercised by the ICC.").
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investigate entire situations, as opposed to just specific cases."i 6 State
waivers in favor of the ICC forum are thus both an easement of the Court's
duty to abide by a Younger-type abstention, but it can also cause the Court
difficulty in maintaining its independence and the viability of the
complementarity regime.
Another interesting aspect to the issue of waivers and referrals is a
referral to the ICC according to Article 13(b) by the Security Council acting
under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. As seen in the Darfur
referral, Sudan is not a State Party and is not voluntarily waiving the
complementarity principle. The extent to which a state may involuntarily
waive the Younger abstention doctrine is also an issue that plagues the
federal courts. The federal courts have decided that states can actually
involuntarily waive the Younger abstention principles and that federal
courts may consider the abstention doctrine sua sponte.1  In the ICC
realm, these concerns are slightly different because the Court has an
obligation under Article 53(1)(b) to consider admissibility issues such that
considering admissibility sua sponte is already assumed. The issue of
whether States may involuntarily waive into an ICC proceeding, however,
is more of a political and practical issue than a jurisdictional issue. 188 The
Rome Statute confers the ICC with jurisdiction, but investigating,
prosecuting and enforcing a judgment without any cooperation from the
State would be difficult, if not impossible. The Security Council referral,
by virtue of it extending from the UN and with it the UNs own powers,
endows the ICC only with an additional ally and resource, but it does not
extend the Court's jurisdiction beyond what Article 13(b) allows. 189
Involuntary waiver in the ICC sense thus only arises in the context of a
Security Council referral and results in more reliance on the UNs
capabilities to coerce cooperation than in the ICCs ability to impose its
jurisdiction.
186. El Zeidy, supra note 11, at 914-15 (citing the intentional selection of the term "situation"
as opposed to "cases" because it narrowed the Court's "independence in the exercise of its jurisdiction").
187. Stagner, supra note 169, at 177.
188. Sadat and Carden, supra note 1, at 414-15 ("Complementarity has a substantive
component, a procedural component, and a component that we will call 'political,' or 'prudential' for
lack of a better term.... The prudential aspect refers to the policy choices made in deciding what kinds
of cases should be in the ICC, rather than national courts, which, as noted above, means that some cases
that are clearly within the Court's jurisdiction (prescriptively) will not be heard by the Court."); See also
Kenneth Abbott, Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT'L
ORG. 401 (2000) (noting the increasing tendency to make political decisions through legal institutions).
189. CONDORELLI AND VILLALPLANDO, supra note 156, at 571.
[Vol. 13:3
Sheng
D. Possible Future Grounds for ICC Admissibility Exceptions
There are several additional theories of federal courts doctrine that
may also be relevant to the ICC structure, but which will only be touched
on briefly here. The notion of independent and adequate state grounds as
justification for federal deference to state decisions provides another fruitful
area for comparison with ICC admissibility proceedings. The basic
proposition of the independent and adequate doctrine comes from the idea
that if the decision of the highest state court rests on grounds that are
independent of the federal grounds and the state grounds are adequate to
support the decision, then the federal court should not review even the
federal issue. 90  To be independent, the state ground "must not be
intertwined with or dependent upon a federal question either explicitly or
implicitly."' 9' To be considered adequate, "[a] decision based on state
law... would necessarily be affirmed even if any decision on federal law
were reversed."' 92 These grounds for independent and adequate in an ICC
context, however, might be "lost in translation" because of the difference
between the national-supranational relationship and the state-federal
relationship. The lack of distinct supranational grounds as opposed to the
national grounds currently seems to imply that all national grounds are
independent and adequate for whatever decision the State makes.
Eventually, however, the ICC may need to delve further into how it
will cope with the gap between national proceedings on the ordinary crimes
basis and proceedings utilizing the Rome Statute language. Finding the
ordinary crimes proceedings to not be independent or adequate in relation to
the supranational law might be just one method of distinguishing them from
Rome Statute standards such that the ICC can intervene an unwilling or
unable finding. 93  Solidifying such a stance will require, more or less, a
190. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, at 686.
191. Thomas Baker, The Ambiguous Independent and Adequate State Ground in Criminal
Cases: Federalism Along a Mobius Strip, 19 GA. L. REv. 799 (1985) (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032 (1983) and Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940)).
192. Richard Matasar and Gregory Bruch, Procedural Common Law, Federal Jurisdictional
Policy, andAbandonment of the Adequate and independent State Grounds Doctrine, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
1291, 1292 n.2 (1986) (citing Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935)).
193. Some scholars believe admissibility based on discrepancies in legal systems to be a
foregone conclusion. See BROOMHALL, supra note 13, at 81 ("the absence from national law of the
prohibitions, defences, general principles and sentences set out in the Statute could support a finding of
admissibility by the Court on the grounds of inaction at the national level .... This could be the case
where national law has definitions of crimes that are too narrow, general principles of law more
restrictive than those in the Statute, or defences which are overly broad. In such cases, the State would
not be able to impose criminal responsibility on acts criminal under the Statute, resulting in de facto
impunity. The resulting inaction could render the case admissible although, presumably, the gap
between national law and the Statute would have to be a significant one before the Court would consider
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presumption that States should implement legislation incorporating the core
crimes into their national laws.or else suffer a finding that their ordinary
crime laws are inadequate or not independent of Rome Statute issues.' 94
VII. CONCLUSION
The complementarity regime serves as the gatekeeper for any
investigations and prosecutions the ICC may be facing. Complementarity's
most interesting feature, however, is its dual role as both a guard that keeps
the Court's jurisdiction from reaching beyond its mandate and as an usher
that sweeps cases into the ICCs jurisdiction when States shirk their duties.
The admissibility requirement based on a showing of State unwillingness or
inability is the aperture through which all proceedings must pass.
The complementarity regime also highlights the difficult nature of the
supranational-national relationship and focuses the Court's limitations in a
way that accommodates comparison with the federal-state relationship.
Through these doctrines of exhaustion, finality, and abstention, the Court is
able to take a glimpse at what its future might entail. Any suggestions for
what the Court might attempt to accomplish with referrals such as Darfur
may stem from the comparison.
exercising jurisdiction, if national authorities were otherwise proceeding in good faith."). Even so, the
argument that a procedural rule is not a bar to jurisdiction leaves the Court with the ne bis in idem bar
under Article 20. It would seem that, unless the Court could show that the State had pursued the case
knowing that it would, or intending to, encounter the procedural obstacle, the ICC could not prosecute
the case.
194. In the end, complementarity, in order to function, necessitates an adaptation by States of
the Rome Statute standards. See Kleffoer, supra note 59, at 94 ("in order for the ICC to effectively
perform its complementary function, comprehensive implementation is indispensable. To interpret the
provisions on complementarity so as to give them the fullest weight and effect consistent with the ICC's
functions therefore involves an obligation on States parties to establish their jurisdiction over the ICC
crimes to the extent required for the purpose of national prosecution.").
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